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Ehrlichman: And the India-Pakistan thing in that larger canvas is really not 
understood by the average guy to be all that important. It’s a bunch of—
Nixon: Unwashed heathen. They’re picking away at each other over there. 
Ehrlichman: Either side would have been the wrong side.
—December 24, 19711
Kissinger: Mr. President, by next October people will say: “What India-
Pakistan crisis?”...When the history is written, this will look like one of our 
better maneuvers.
      —March 31, 19722
      
In his 1978 memoir, President Richard M. Nixon claimed, “By using diplomatic 
signals and behind-the-scenes pressures we had been able to save West Pakistan 
from the imminent threat of Indian aggression and domination. We had also once 
again avoided a major confrontation with the Soviet Union.”3 Kissinger’s far more 
detailed chapter on “the tilt,” in the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, 
complements and largely corroborates Nixon’s.4 Kissinger argued that Nixon did 
not want to “squeeze” Pakistani President Agha “Yahya” Khan, and tried to put for-
ward a neutral posture to the bloodshed in East Pakistan that was initially triggered 
by a series of natural disasters.5 Kissinger also contended that Nixon did not want 
to encourage secessionist elements within an ally, Pakistan, which was divided into 
two wings—East and West—over 1,000 miles apart astride its hostile neighbor, 
India. Above all, before his secret trip to China in July 1971, Kissinger wanted to 
preserve the special channel to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and he saw 
three obstacles to handling the situation in South Asia: “the policy of India, our own 
public debate, and the indiscipline of our bureaucracy.”6 Kissinger stressed that 
the US attempted to restrain India by making clear American opposition to Indo-
Pakistani conflict and attempting to enlist Soviet assistance with their ally, India, 
towards the same goal. Nevertheless, the two South Asian countries marched to-
wards conflict following a cyclone in November 1970, the resulting devastation and 
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flooding in East Pakistan, Yahya’s election loss to pro-Bangladeshi independence 
politician Mujib Rahman in December 1970, and Yahya’s subsequent crackdown 
of “Operation Searchlight” in East Pakistan against Bangladeshi independence in 
March 1971. The environmental and political upheaval caused an unprecedented 
refugee crisis as Bengalis fled from East Pakistan into India and, with Indian back-
ing, organized an independent government-in-exile and resistance movement. 
 The August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 
the heels of Kissinger’s groundbreaking trip to China was, in Kissinger’s view, a 
particular cause for alarm because it “was deliberately steering nonaligned India 
toward a de facto alliance with the Soviet Union” and enabled India to take an un-
compromising stance against the instability in Pakistan.7 Kissinger faulted Indian 
intransigence, interference in East Pakistan, and a refusal to negotiate on substan-
tive matters, rather than Pakistani provocations, as the precipitating causes of the 
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Kissinger also believed the crisis had been solved at 
the edge of an abyss by the various messages sent through confidential channels 
(including the White House-Kremlin “Hot Line”) and diplomatic channels to the 
Soviet Union, which allegedly led to the Indian acceptance of a ceasefire and the 
preservation of West Pakistan at Soviet behest. Kissinger maintained that Indian 
restraint on attacking West Pakistan was, in no doubt, due to “a reluctant decision 
resulting from Soviet pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistence, in-
cluding the fleet movement and the willingness to risk the [May 1972 Moscow] 
summit.”8 
 In the face of the President’s and National Security Advisor’s memoirs, 
however, nearly every other account of the US response to the South Asian crisis 
has faulted the Nixon administration for its handling of the crisis, for its “tilt” to the 
dictatorial and arguably genocidal regime of Yahya Khan, its anti-Indian bias, its 
distorted reading of intelligence, and its claim that the US “saved” West Pakistan 
by challenging India and the Soviet Union. Critics have further charged that Nixon 
acted recklessly by sending Task Force 74, a flotilla led by the nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, to the Indian Ocean at the height of the war, thereby 
exacerbating tensions and risking broader conflict between competing alliances: In-
dia and the Soviet Union on one side; the US, the PRC, and Pakistan on the other.9 
 The charges levied by critics trace their origin to investigative journalist 
Jack Anderson’s Pulitzer-Prize-winning syndicated columns in December 1971 - 
January 1972 that documented the Nixon administration’s “tilt” towards Pakistan. 
Anderson’s exposé was based on a selection of sensitive, high level, leaked docu-
ments he had obtained from the executive branch and the military. The most dam-
aging sources Anderson obtained came from the Washington Special Action Group 
(WSAG), the National Security Council-based policy body that addressed the South 
48
Nichter and Moss
Asian crisis. In his 1973 book, The Anderson Papers, which further expanded the 
critique of the Nixon-Kissinger South Asia policy, the journalist charged, “Richard 
Nixon brought the United States to the edge of another world war. His actions were 
deliberate; he operated in secret; and he lied to the American people about his ac-
tions.”10 
 Those critical of Nixon’s policy have dominated the historiography of the 
episode on the Subcontinent and have largely followed Anderson’s groundbreaking 
work, adding new insights based on documentary evidence as it became available 
over the last four decades. The critics range from ex-State Department officials, 
such as Christopher Van Hollen and William Bundy, to memoirists, like former 
Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin and Indian Foreign Secretary T. 
N. Kaul, to journalists, biographers, and historians. Kissinger-biographers number 
among the critics and include investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, Time maga-
zine editor Walter Isaacson, and Finnish scholar Jussi Hanhimäki. Perhaps the best 
sourced examination focusing on the South Asian episode is the work of historian 
Robert McMahon, who has based his scholarship on excellent edited volumes pro-
duced by F. S. Aijazuddin and Roedad Khan, in addition to two volumes of official 
documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States produced by the State 
Department.11 
 Yet, despite the preponderance of rich documentary sources, there is still 
material that has been hitherto untapped. To bridge the gap between the Nixon ad-
ministration’s perceptions and policy responses to the South Asian crisis and war of 
1971, this article uses Nixon tapes material that has never been published, in addi-
tion to the recently declassified high level US-Soviet “backchannel” exchanges. The 
tapes provide the candid assessments by Nixon, Kissinger and other policymakers 
as events were reported across the executive offices, with moments of excitement, 
disappointment, and a range of emotions expressed in raw, uncensored language.12 
In contrast to the unpolished nature of the tapes, the published US and Soviet back-
channel exchanges show the direct, written communications between the White 
House and the Kremlin in the lead-up to and during the short Indo-Pakistani War 
of 1971. Soon after Nixon assumed office in 1969, Kissinger, on the President’s 
behalf, met privately with the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, 
and conducted a candid exchange of views that grew to encompass all major issues 
in superpower relations over the following years. The US Department of State and 
the Russian Foreign Ministry jointly compiled, translated, annotated, and published 
nearly the entire record—over one thousand pages—in US-Soviet Relations in the 
Era of Détente, 1969-1972. This unique collection provides an invaluable snapshot 
into these important meetings between US and Soviet interlocutors, a record that 
was long shrouded in secrecy.13
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 Utilizing these new materials, we argue that the Nixon administration’s han-
dling of the crisis on the Subcontinent was neither the abject failure as depicted by 
critics, nor was it the success that Nixon and Kissinger presented in their memoirs. 
In fact, this article reaches conclusions midway between the administration and its 
critics. The picture of the White House response to the crisis reveals that although 
Nixon and Kissinger superimposed a Cold War distortion on a regional situation, 
they responded logically. The Nixon administration steadily escalated diplomatic 
signals and the top policymakers sincerely believed that India had launched ex-
ternal aggression—not Pakistan—with its support for Mukthi Bahini (liberation 
force) raids into what was then East Pakistan.
 Several additional themes run through the narrative of this article, many of 
which were also reflected in US-Soviet backchannel communications and in the 
taped conversations. Not surprisingly, Nixon and Kissinger’s policy perceptions 
were clearly colored by their personal experiences with Indira Gandhi and Yahya 
Khan. The White House was unwilling to dismiss Yahya’s role as an honest broker 
in Sino-American rapprochement and likewise saw duplicity on the part of Indira 
Gandhi after she visited Washington, DC in early November 1971 and claimed that 
India had no desire for war with Pakistan. Additionally, the surreptitiously recorded 
conversations between the President and his advisers, a portion of the 3,700-hour 
collection of Nixon tapes, are rife with gendered speech and appeals to masculine 
“toughness” that colored Nixon’s actions. Significantly, the frequent contact with 
the Soviets during the war mitigates some of the criticism of recklessness.
 The tapes and communications with the Soviets also demonstrate that Nix-
on and Kissinger believed that the war started on November 21, 1971, in contrast to 
the date most often cited as the start of the war, December 3, 1971, when Pakistan 
attacked forward Indian airbases. The tapes and backchannel records show that 
Nixon and Kissinger certainly believed in November-December 1971 that an Indi-
an attack could result in the “dismemberment” and Balkanization of West Pakistan, 
regardless if the impression came from a misreading of intelligence. The Nixon 
administration attempted to spin the stories on the war to downplay American in-
volvement on Pakistan’s behalf, and due to the reliance on backchannel diplomacy, 
it is understandable that the administration’s actions were criticized at the time and 
afterwards for the dichotomy between the public and private lines. Lastly, the expe-
rience of the Nixon White House during the South Asian crisis reinforced the belief 
in the White House that the Soviets would attempt to gain at American expense and 
that the administration would need to take a hard line to bring the Soviets into line.
 Unfortunately, the focus on the US and Soviet materials is illuminating but 
cannot comprehensively address the multifaceted 1971 South Asian crisis and war 
because the situation on the ground outpaced Washington’s and Moscow’s efforts 
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to manage the crisis at the time. Until high level Indian materials, Indo-Soviet ex-
changes, Soviet Politburo meetings and other sources become available—if ever—
the Pakistani, Soviet, and Indian sides of the story will remain incomplete. In the 
interim, a more nuanced understanding of US policy will need to suffice.
Backchannels and the Indo-Pakistani War
The Indo-Pakistani war was the quintessential example of a regional conflict pro-
jected onto the backdrop of perceived superpower conflict and foreign policy man-
aged from the White House. Nixon and Kissinger directed policy during the crisis 
but used the State Department to send messages through official channels and to 
build a public relations case for action in the UN.14 The policies partially grew 
out of inherent distrust for the “bureaucracy” at the State Department, but Nixon 
and Kissinger still relied on higher level Department officials, such as Secretary 
of State William P. Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian affairs Joseph Sisco. Although the US response was more complex 
than either supporters or detractors have argued, it is clear that the administration 
used backchannels to convey their desire to use Soviet influence to contain the 
Indians and to contain the potential risks of the regional conflict expanding into a 
superpower conflict due to entangling alliances and obligations.
 The White House initially believed that India wanted to avoid conflict and 
argued for several months that the US and the Soviet Union had “parallel interests” 
in trying to prevent an Indo-Pakistani war. At the same time, American policymak-
ers realistically recognized that a refugee crisis could be the first step down the road 
to conflict.15 The theme of “parallel interests” also entered into the Kissinger-Do-
brynin backchannel. For example, at Nixon’s request, Kissinger invited Dobrynin 
to the presidential retreat at Camp David on June 10, 1971, for a tour d’horizon of 
US-Soviet relations.16 Dobrynin reported back to Moscow that, with regard to the 
brewing Indo-Pakistani crisis, Kissinger claimed that Washington had “reliable in-
formation” that India “has still not rejected the idea of providing armed assistance 
to East Pakistan.”17 
 Before departing on his secret trip to China, Kissinger informed Dobrynin 
that he had been instructed by President Nixon to “visit Delhi and confidentially, 
but in the strongest terms, call Indira Gandhi’s attention to the fact that the US 
takes a very serious view of this dangerous Indian course of action and the serious 
consequences associated with it.” In the event of an Indo-Pakistani war, Kissinger 
warned that the US would “cut off all future economic aid to India.” Dobrynin re-
ported back to the Kremlin: “In short, Kissinger summarized, the US Government 
is for maintaining the territorial status quo between India and Pakistan while at 
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the same time seeking a political solution to the problems that have arisen.” Once 
again, Kissinger had stressed the parallel interests of the US and the USSR, and 
“made it clear that the President [considered] the confidential exchange of views 
on this matter between him and the Soviet leadership to be useful,” and it would 
“revisit this issue” after Kissinger’s return from Asia.18
 In response to the US opening to China, announced by President Nixon in a 
nationwide televised address on July 15, 1971, India took the diplomatic initiative 
by tilting toward the Soviet Union, taking out an insurance policy of sorts. Dusting 
off a treaty that had been negotiated but never concluded, Indian Ambassador to 
the USSR and close associate of Indira Gandhi, D. P. Dhar, traveled to Moscow in 
late July 1971 and quickly concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, 
and Cooperation on August 9th.19 This development signified the first shift in the 
Soviet position on the crisis away from US-Soviet “parallel interests.” Indo-Soviet 
collusion expanded and was, perhaps, an unintended consequence of US geopoliti-
cal paradigm shift towards China, in addition to being a brilliant Indian Realpoli-
tik counterpunch to the Pakistani channels Nixon and Kissinger had used to open 
China.
 On the morning of August 9, 1971, Kissinger informed the President about 
the Indo-Soviet treaty. Nixon inadvertently raised the subject by noting from his 
morning news summary that he had seen that “Gromyko was down there talking to 
that damned Indian Foreign Minister [Swaran Singh].” Kissinger replied that the 
Soviet Union and India had just signed the 25-year treaty and explained that the 
Indians and the Soviets would “consult with each other in case of aggression of 
other countries against one of the parties.” Talking with a sense of bravado, Kiss-
inger promised, “to give that Indian Ambassador [to the US, L.K. Jha] unshirted 
hell.” Audibly angry, Nixon replied, “And the thing is, though, they [the Indians] 
should well understand if they’re going to choose to go with the Russians, they’re 
choosing not to go with us.” The President added, “Now, Goddamnit, they’ve got 
to know this...Goddamnit, who’s giving them a billion dollars a year? Shit, the 
Russians aren’t giving them a billion dollars a year, Henry.” Kissinger suggested 
that the response to India and the Soviet Union be handled in the National Security 
Council, i.e. from the White House and via private channels:
Kissinger: Bureaucratically I am going—we have to keep this in the NSC 
system because—
Nixon: Hell yes.
Kissinger: —while the combination of Bill [Rogers] and [Joe] Sisco is go-
ing to be hip-shooting all over the place if they do it alone, and all on the 
Indian side because they’re very influenced, as you know, by The Washing-
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ton Post and New York Times. So far—
Nixon: [Sighs]
Kissinger: —I’ve—Bill has, has been fine. But now that Sisco is back—
Nixon: He’s going up to New York, is he?
Kissinger: Yeah. Well, I don’t mind. I think it’s good for him to do the 
relief—
Nixon: That’s on the refugees—
Kissinger: As long it’s relief, but all the briefing papers he gets—Every time 
he listens to his own bureaucracy, he’s in trouble because all of them are 
pro-Indian, all of them are—are really Kennedyites…20
 As the conversation progressed, Kissinger elucidated the practice of tri-
angular diplomacy and directly linked the policy of improved relations with the 
Soviet Union through a potential summit meeting to the US opening to China, the 
simmering Arab-Israeli dispute, and the situation on the Subcontinent. Kissinger 
believed that the fear of Sino-American collusion would keep the Soviets in line, 
and the prospect of a summit meeting and the concurrent agreements that would be 
signed in Moscow could help delay another war in the Middle East and force the 
Soviets to restrain the Indians and avert war on the Subcontinent:
Kissinger: But their major reason is they’re afraid of what you will do in 
Peking if they’re in a posture of hostility to you. So they would like to have 
the visit hanging over Peking. They would like that you have the visit in the 
pocket— 
Nixon: I see. 
Kissinger: So that you will not—So that you will be restrained in Peking. 
We, in turn, want it because it’s helpful to us to have Moscow hanging over 
Peking. It reinsures…the Peking visit. And, after all, when I handed your 
letter to Dobrynin, I didn’t even mention the summit. He said, “Does the 
fact that there is no summit in there mean the President has lost interest?” 
He said, “Because I can tell you unofficially they are considering it now 
at the highest level in Moscow and there’ll be an answer.” And he said…
speaking for himself—“they’re not letting me go on vacation is because 
they want me to transmit that answer, that proposal.” 
Nixon: Hmm. Well, either way, we shall see. 
Kissinger: …And for us…then we’d be in great shape. Because if the sum-
mit is coming up, say, in the middle of May [1972] in Moscow, we’d know 
there won’t be a Middle East blowup before then, because they’ll sit on the 
Egyptians. 
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Nixon: Yeah. 
Kissinger: That and India is—are the two big problems. 
Nixon: Yeah. 
Kissinger: That means we’ll be through the better part of next year, and they 
can’t start something up right after the summit, either.
Nixon: Hmm.
Kissinger: And we can keep the two to control each other.21 
 When Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Washington in early 
September, the situation in South Asia was discussed within the broader context of 
superpower relations.22 Nixon told Gromyko that he feared the situation in the Sub-
continent could “explode into war in the area.” Gromyko responded that the Soviet 
Government also wanted to “prevent a confrontation” and that Moscow had shared 
its policy with Mrs. Gandhi. Despite New Delhi’s protestations to the Kremlin that 
it wanted to avoid war, Gromyko noted that the Soviet leadership “did not have as 
much confidence as in the case of the Indian leadership.” Furthermore, Gromyko 
“was gratified to know” that Soviet and US policies in averting war were in line 
and that both “stood on the position of counseling both sides to exercise restraint.” 
Nixon told the Soviet Foreign Minister that the two would “be in touch with each 
other on this situation.”23 Nixon also reminded Gromyko of the importance of us-
ing the backchannel: “I do not take charge of things that don’t matter. Where they 
matter, like between our countries, then I make the decisions.” The President em-
phasized, “We couldn’t have done it without that channel.”24 
 By late October, as a result of the Indo-Soviet treaty and several high-level 
trips between Soviet and Indian diplomatic, political, and military officials, Soviet 
attitudes began to change from agreement with American pronouncements about 
restraint and averting war towards a sharper criticism of Pakistani actions. As two 
scholars of the Indo-Pakistani conflict have noted, “the total shift in Moscow’s po-
sition on ‘Bangladesh’ occurred only after Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Moscow from 27 
to 29 September.”25 The change in Soviet attitude did not go unnoticed in American 
policymaking circles and entered into the various US-Soviet channels amidst mul-
tifaceted discussions of summit planning, the Middle East, trade, and other areas 
of US-Soviet relations. The White House increasingly saw the Soviet Union as 
an enabler of Indian aggression, a pattern that also fit with the perceptions of the 
Soviet Union enabling North Vietnamese intransigence by supplying materiel. As 
the pattern became clear, Nixon and Kissinger felt that the US would have to risk 
détente, and mild protests gave way to vigorous protests that the Soviet response 
to American wishes during the Indo-Pakistani war could be a “watershed” in US-
Soviet relations.
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 At the beginning of November, Indira Gandhi visited Washington to press 
India’s case and explain the dire nature of the refugee crisis. Presidential scholar 
Robert Dallek correctly called the “two conversations on November 4 and 5…case 
studies in heads of state speaking past each other.”26 It is more likely, however, that 
Nixon and Gandhi had already made up their minds long before they met in the 
Oval Office that autumn. Nixon believed that India wanted to confront Pakistan and 
underlined the potential consequences: American aid to India would be cut off, and 
the American people would not understand aggressive action. Gandhi knew that 
Nixon would not take India’s side and had already calculated that the consequences 
would short-lived.27 The November 4th conversation featured Kissinger doing most 
of the talking, while the conversation on November 5th was one of Nixon’s foreign 
policy assessments, with Kissinger adding some important details on Southeast 
Asia, and, particularly, the Peking initiative to assuage Indian concerns.28
 Most accounts of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, particularly those which have 
examined the American response, have either ignored or downplayed the events of 
late-November 1971 and have dated the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 to 
the Pakistani Air Force’s December 3, 1971, raid on airbases in northwestern In-
dia.29 The perception that India was going to go to war against Pakistan was fairly 
well established in the wake of Gandhi’s trip to Washington, nearly a month before 
Yahya commenced the air raid. American policymakers were kept well apprised of 
events on the ground by their connections to the Pakistani leadership and knew of 
Mukti Bahini attacks into East Pakistan with the support of regular Indian armor, 
artillery, and infantry.30 Kissinger-biographer Walter Isaacson wrote, “On Novem-
ber 22, when India conducted a cross-border operation into East Pakistan in support 
of Bengali separatists, Kissinger was one of the few (then or in retrospect) who 
considered this incident the start of full-scale war.” Isaacson continued, “The State 
Department, on the other hand, downplayed the seriousness of these skirmishes; 
even Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan cabled the next day to say he still hoped a 
war could be avoided.”31 
 Although the point about “full scale” war may be accurate, the broader 
argument missed several important factors, including: the State Department was 
receiving contradictory reports from both Pakistan and India; as demonstrated in 
several secretly taped conversations, Nixon and Kissinger genuinely believed that 
India had started the war by supporting Mukti Bahini forces with regular Indian 
troops on Pakistani territory; and, most importantly, the simple fact of the situa-
tion on the ground was that Indian regular forces had violated Pakistan’s border 
in support of insurgents who were both trained and supplied by India. As Richard 
Sisson and Leo Rose noted in their landmark study on the conflict, published be-
fore Isaacson’s biography of Kissinger, “because of the air strikes, Pakistan is often 
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depicted as having taken the initiative in starting the war. In more realistic, rather 
than formal, terms, however, the war began on 21 November, when Indian military 
units occupied Pakistani territory as part of the preliminary phase to the offensive 
directed at capturing and liberating Dhaka.”32 
 As reports of the number and severity of border skirmishes increased, Kiss-
inger convened the interagency WSAG to develop a response. Kissinger’s planned 
response of going to the UN—minus the factor of the US-Soviet backchannels, 
which was unbeknownst to most of the group’s members—developed largely out 
of the assessment by the State Department’s Joseph Sisco. Sisco told Kissinger:
In the present circumstances, where we do not have an all-out war but do 
have a significant increase in the numbers of incidents, we could try to get 
some form of restraining order from the Security Council which hopefully 
would arrest or slow down further deterioration of the situation…We ob-
viously need facts. But I think we know enough about the nature of the 
insurgency to believe it would be a good thing to begin to move our efforts 
somewhat more into the public domain and to begin to place some of the 
responsibility on the shoulders of the UN.33
On November 22, 1971, American policymakers certainly believed that there had 
been a major incident and that India had attacked Pakistan by Mukti Bahini proxy. 
Kissinger called Nixon at 12:45 p.m. and said, “There is no doubt there is a large 
encroachment taking place and it is heavily backed by the Indians.”34 In a memo 
later that day, Kissinger relayed Pakistani radio broadcasts of an Indian offensive 
and added, “we have no independent evidence but it seems apparent that there 
has been a major incident.”35 In a never-before-published transcript of Oval Office 
meeting with the President that afternoon, after continued reports were coming in 
through regular cable traffic and via backchannels, Kissinger answered Nixon’s 
queries about the situation on the Subcontinent:
Nixon: Is Yahya saying it’s war or not?
Kissinger: Yeah, they’re saying it’s war.
Nixon: And the Indians say it isn’t?
Kissinger: It isn’t. That’s right. It’s a naked case of aggression, Mr. Presi-
dent ...
Nixon: Goddamnit, maybe we ought to say that.
 Kissinger still hoped that war could be averted, despite the ‘naked case 
of Indian aggression,’ but the threshold had been crossed. As an overall strategy, 
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Kissinger endorsed the idea of coordinated action with the PRC in the UN Secu-
rity Council. Kissinger suggested: “we ought to talk to—which I’ll do tomorrow 
night36—to the Chinese to find out what they’ll do at the Security Council…we 
don’t have to go as far as the Chinese, but I would lean—” Nixon interrupted: “I 
want to go damn near as far. Now, understand: I don’t like the Indians.” Kissinger 
responded, “We ought to lean pretty close to the Chinese and make it an interna-
tional [action]” but was again interrupted. Nixon repeated his theme: “Let’s remem-
ber the Pakistanis have been our friends…and the damn Indians have not been. You 
know?”37 Kissinger hoped to coordinate with the Chinese and other powers in order 
to diplomatically isolate India and its Soviet Bloc supporters.
 At Kissinger’s suggestion and with Nixon’s approval, the State Department 
sent a demarche to PM Gandhi on November 27th. To the Indians, the note said, 
“Military engagements along India’s border with East Pakistan have increased in 
number and strength. Tanks, aircraft and regular forces have been involved on both 
sides.”38 The message to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was similar and explicit: 
“The recent border incidents…in the Jessore section of East Pakistan have been of 
particular concern to me, as I am sure they have been to you…there appears to be 
an imminent danger of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan.”39 Despite 
the Nixon administration’s best efforts to deescalate the situation, decisions in New 
Delhi and Islamabad had been made and the war was a foregone conclusion by late 
November. India had thrown down the gauntlet, and the fatalistic Pakistani leader 
decided to pick it up with a bungled attempt to take out Indian forward airbases on 
December 3rd.40
 Nixon and Kissinger decided to fight the battle in the UN, in allegiance with 
Communist China, and to make the Indo-Pakistani war a litmus test in US-Soviet 
relations. Kissinger and, particularly, Nixon were disinclined to believe the Indian 
side of the story and instead trusted the Pakistanis. From the vantage point of the 
Oval Office, Yahya had served as an honest broker in opening China and had ac-
cepted American recommendations for a peaceful resolution of the crisis—despite, 
as they saw them, exaggerated reports of his domestic strong-arm tactics. Nixon 
and Kissinger, at the same time, believed that Gandhi had moved away from two 
decades of Indian non-alignment and had allied the world’s most populous democ-
racy with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they believed she had lied to them dur-
ing her trip to Washington. For the Nixon White House, the unanswered questions 
included the status of West Pakistan and whether or not it would be Balkanized, 
the fate of Kashmir, and whether or not East Pakistan would gain independence, 
become part of India, or some combination thereof. 
 Kissinger called Nixon on the morning of December 3rd to inform him “that 
West Pakistan has attacked because situation in East collapsing.” As for the Paki-
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stani attack on India, Nixon saw it akin to “Russia claiming to be attacked by Fin-
land.”41 Immediately responding to the news, Kissinger convened an emergency 
meeting of the WSAG.42 CIA Director Richard Helms confirmed that the Pakistanis 
had attacked the Indians, an act, the group largely agreed, likely provoked by Indian 
actions over the preceding two weeks, although confirming intelligence was not 
available.43
 Despite the onset of hostilities, the US-Soviet backchannel dialogue on the 
war itself, handled via Soviet chargé d’affairs Yuly Vorontsov (since Dobrynin had 
been recalled to Moscow for instructions), did not commence in earnest until the af-
ternoon of December 5, 1971. Kissinger informed the President that the American 
efforts for a ceasefire and withdrawal had the support of the Chinese, and only Rus-
sia and Poland had opposed the efforts. Kissinger was displeased with the Soviet 
behavior and told Nixon, “Now, what the Russians this morning have launched is a 
blistering attack on Pakistan in TASS and in effect, have warned China against get-
ting involved. What we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian power play to humiliate 
the Chinese and also somewhat us.” If the US failed to support Pakistan, Kissinger 
warned, “if we collapse now, the Soviets won’t respect us for it; the Chinese will 
despise us and the other countries will draw their conclusions.”44 
 Kissinger then directed NSC staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt to draft a telegram 
and ordered Haig to prepare talking points according to the President’s telephone 
instructions, in preparation for a meeting with Vorontsov at 4:00 p.m. on December 
5th. As scheduled, Kissinger met with Vorontsov in the Map Room at the White 
House. Kissinger told the DCM that “A letter for the General Secretary would be 
delivered the next day, but in view of the urgency of the situation, the President 
wanted it transmitted to Moscow immediately.” At a time of improving relations, 
Kissinger continued, “The President did not understand how the Soviet Union could 
believe that it was possible to work on the broad amelioration of our relationships 
while at the same time encouraging the Indian military aggression against Paki-
stan.” The President believed that Indian ‘aggression’ in instigating armed conflict 
with Pakistan violated the established order and the UN charter, and wondered why 
“a member country of the United Nations was being dismembered by the military 
forces of another member country which had close relationships with the Soviet 
Union.”45
 The next day, Kissinger had Nixon’s formal letter delivered to Vorontsov at 
the Soviet Embassy, but not via “usual channels.”46 Still hoping to move from con-
frontation to cooperation, Nixon wrote Brezhnev that it was his understanding from 
his September meeting with Gromyko that the US and Soviet Union were “entering 
a new period in our relations which would be marked by mutual restraint and in 
which neither you nor we would act in crises to seek unilateral advantages.” Soviet 
58
Nichter and Moss
support of “the Indian Government’s open use of force against the independence 
and integrity of Pakistan, merely serves to aggravate an already grave situation,” 
Nixon warned. The only solution, in the president’s determination, was that “Ur-
gent action is required and I believe that your great influence in New Delhi should 
serve these ends.”47
 Vorontsov met with Kissinger at 11:00 p.m. to personally deliver Brezh-
nev’s equally firm reply. According to Vorontsov, Brezhnev argued that the root 
cause of the conflict was the “result of actions of the Pakistani government against 
the population of East Pakistan” and that the Soviet Union desired “a political set-
tlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the will of its population as 
clearly expressed in the December 1970 elections.” In Brezhnev’s mind, the US did 
not act “actively enough and precisely enough…towards removing the main source 
of tension in relations between Pakistan and India.” Brezhnev vigorously disputed 
Nixon’s argument that the India-Pakistan crisis would be a watershed in US-Soviet 
relations:
Differences in the appraisal of specific events in the world…may arise, 
and there is nothing unnatural in that. However, if in such cases, instead of 
business-like search for realistic solutions, to start talking about a “critical 
stage” or “watershed” in Soviet-American relations, it would hardly help 
finding such solutions, and would make it still harder to envisage that it will 
facilitate improvement of Soviet-American relations and their stability.48
 In the face of Soviet pushback, Nixon took an even harder line with the 
Soviets and used additional signals, some public and some private, to reiterate the 
importance of preserving West Pakistan. To increase pressure on India and demon-
strate to the Soviet Union that the US was serious about West Pakistan, Nixon au-
thorized the movement of the USS Enterprise task force to the Bay of Bengal, and 
reiterated to Vorontsov—through Haig—that the White House expected a written 
reply to Nixon’s letter of December 6th. Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger called 
in the Soviet Agriculture Minister, Vladimir Matskevich—then visiting Washing-
ton—to the Oval Office to convey to the Soviet leadership the seriousness with 
which American policymakers viewed the Indo-Pakistani war. Clearly informed by 
the memory of the Jordanian crisis of September 1970, both Nixon and Kissinger 
wanted to play it tough with the Soviets on India-Pakistan and save West Pakistan 
from dismemberment.49 Both men also determined that forcing a change in Soviet 
behavior was worth risking the summit and even the backchannel itself.
 In a brief afternoon discussion on December 6th about cutting off aid to 
India, Kissinger raised the late night meeting the previous evening and the receipt 
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of the Soviet oral note from Vorontsov. He explained, “I really read the riot act to 
him…about Soviet participation. And we’re sending a note that you dictated today 
over to…Brezhnev.” Nixon blurted out, “I don’t know whether it’ll do any good. 
Goddamn them, they haven’t done anything yet…!” Alluding to the Jordanian and 
Cienfuegos crises a year earlier, Kissinger exclaimed, “My worry is, Mr. President, 
that…we may get into a summer 1970 situation if we don’t show some firmness 
with them, now. Every time we’ve been tough with them, they’ve backed off.”50 
The theme of playing it tough with the Russians clearly appealed to Nixon, who 
also counseled Kissinger to stay the course in the UN and to work with the Chinese. 
“Let’s not separate from the Chinese at the UN,” he told Kissinger, “That I will not 
do.” Kissinger agreed. Kissinger again appealed to Nixon’s sense of bravado: “It’s 
a daring game, but we’ve always done well with the daring games.” Nixon saw a 
Chinese feinting maneuver as a good strategy, and, with US backing, the Soviets 
would not dare to attack China: “It’s a daring game, so, with the [US backing the] 
Chinese—[are] the Russians are going to attack China? Are you kidding?”51
 To convey the message to the Soviets that Nixon expected a formal re-
sponse to his letter of December 6, Kissinger had Haig call Vorontsov at 3:50 p.m. 
on December 8. Haig dutifully told the Soviet chargé that Kissinger “wanted you 
to have this message as soon as possible.” In a direct rebuke to the Soviet oral 
response, Haig read, “the President does not feel a response at this time is neces-
sary until he receives a response to his written communication, and he wanted it 
understood that the ‘watershed’ term which he used was very, very pertinent, and 
he considers it a carefully thought-out and valid assessment on his part.”52 While 
Haig was communicating with Vorontsov, Nixon met with Henry Kissinger at the 
President’s hideaway office in the Executive Office Building. Kissinger candidly 
assessed the sequence of events and determined that it was an earlier failure not to 
act toughly with Mrs. Gandhi and the Russians that allowed the war to commence: 
“The mistake was that we should have understood that she [PM Gandhi] was not 
looking for pretext; that she was determined to go. And secondly, we should have 
been much tougher with the Russians.” Nixon asked, “Well, what could we have 
done?” Kissinger explained:
We should have told them what we finally told them last Sunday [December 
5, 1971] that this would mark a watershed in our relationship, that there 
could be no Middle East negotiations if this thing would grow. We would 
have had to play it tough. And thirdly, we should have, once the cat was 
among the pigeons, when they moved on November 22, we had cut [aid] 
off, as you wanted, but we couldn’t get the bureaucracy to do. We could 
60
Nichter and Moss
have cut off economic aid the first or second day, plus all of arms instead of 
waiting ten days and diddling around.53 
 Vorontsov arrived at the White House on the morning of December 9th to 
deliver a letter from General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon. The Soviet 
leader placed the blame on the doorstep of Pakistan, for it was Yahya’s crackdown 
in East Pakistan in spite of the December 1970 elections that had caused the exo-
dus of refugees to India and had provided the spark to the proverbial fuse. Echo-
ing American demands for a ceasefire—but not the withdrawal of Indian forces 
from East Pakistan—followed by a political settlement, Brezhnev stressed that a 
ceasefire would serve as a practical first step towards negotiation. Brezhnev asked 
that the US use its influence on Yahya to achieve that end and asked Nixon for a 
“calm and balanced approach.”54 If Brezhnev had hoped for a “calm and balanced 
approach,” he was likely upset by Vorontsov’s extremely urgent cable to the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry reporting a meeting with Kissinger when the chargé delivered 
Brezhnev’s letter:
Kissinger said, as if speaking on his own behalf, that if India turns all its 
troops against West Pakistan “in the wake of East Pakistan” and tries “to se-
cure a complete victory” over Pakistan, then the United States (“unlike our 
conduct with regard to events in East Pakistan, where the situation is rather 
complex and politically complicated”) would prevent a crushing defeat of 
Pakistan in that case, and to that end would even be willing to undertake 
steps of a military nature: “The Indians must not forget that the US has al-
lied commitments with respect to defending Pakistan from aggression.”55
 Nixon took a hard line position when he received Soviet Agriculture Min-
ister, Vladimir Matskevich, at the White House at 4 p.m. on December 9, 1971.56 
After a friendly introduction in which he recalled an earlier encounter in Moscow in 
1959, the President pleaded with Matskevich: “I believe that you as one who is very 
close to the Chairman, and, of course, you as your top ranking representative…I 
want you to know how strongly I feel personally about this issue, and it may be that 
as a result of this conversation you could convey to Chairman Brezhnev a sense of 
urgency that may lead to a settlement.”57 Intending that his guest serve as a one-
way channel to pass along the ominous implications of an Indian attack on West 
Pakistan directly to Brezhnev, Nixon warned Matskevich:
The first requirement is a ceasefire. The second requirement is that India 
desist from attacks in West Pakistan. If India moves forces against West 
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Pakistan, the United States cannot stand by. The key to the settlement is in 
the hands of the Soviet Union. If the USSR does not restrain the Indians, the 
US will not be able to deal with Yahya. If the Indians continue their military 
operations, we must inevitably look toward a confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.58 
 Reviewing the meeting with the following day, Kissinger assured Nixon 
that the message that the US would protect West Pakistan would reach the Soviet 
leadership. The following exchange is particularly telling for Nixon’s perception of 
the Indians and a sense that the Soviets were pulling the Indian marionette strings:
      
Nixon: But these Indians are cowards. Right?
Kissinger: Right, but with Russian backing. You see, the Russians have sent 
notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them.59 The Russians 
have played a miserable game.
Nixon: So we’ll do the same thing, right?
Kissinger: Exactly.
Nixon: Threatening them with what? If they come in and what?
Kissinger: They’ll do something. They haven’t said what they’ll do. But 
they’ll settle now. After your conversation with Matskevich yesterday, 
they’re going to settle.60 
Kissinger met with Vorontsov on the morning of December 10, and delivered a terse 
letter from Nixon to Brezhnev asserting that Brezhnev’s proposals “concerning the 
political evolution of East Pakistan appear to be met,” but that it would need to be 
followed by “an immediate cease-fire in the West.”61 Kissinger allowed Vorontsov 
to copy the verbatim text of an aide-memoire from November 5, 1962, between 
then Pakistani leader Ayub Khan and US Ambassador McConaughy, in which the 
Kennedy administration reaffirmed previous assurances to “come to Pakistan’s as-
sistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan.”62 As Nixon warned 
in his letter, if a ceasefire in the West did not take place immediately, the US “would 
have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole 
of Pakistan, a friendly country toward which we have obligations.” Nixon con-
tinued to urge the Soviets “in the strongest terms to restrain India “from looking 
westward.”63
 In New York on the evening of December 11th, Kissinger secretly met with 
Huang Hua, the PRC Permanent Representative to the UN and ambassador to Can-
ada to coordinate Sino-American activities about the Indo-Pakistani War. Kissinger 
told Huang, “Incidentally, just so everyone knows exactly what we do, we tell you 
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about our conversations with Soviets; we do not tell the Soviets about our conversa-
tions with you.” Kissinger then raised a matter “of some sensitivity.” The US would 
share information with the Chinese about “Soviet dispositions on your borders” 
and, vaguely, “if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian 
subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, 
the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic.”64 
 Kissinger called Vorontsov on the afternoon of the 11th to inform the So-
viets that the US would “proceed unilaterally,” presumably at the United Nations, 
if it did not hear from the Soviet leadership. Vorontsov informed Kissinger that 
Moscow had dispatched the First Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasily 
V. Kuznetsov, to India “in direct connection to whatever we have discussed here.”65 
Nixon and Kissinger worried aloud that an Indian attack on West Pakistan might 
provoke Chinese action in support of Pakistan against India, which, in turn, could 
escalate even further if the Soviets moved against China to support India. Nixon 
believed it would be “crystal clear,” “naked aggression” if India continued military 
action after East Pakistan was “wrapped up.” Kissinger explained that Indian For-
eign Minister Swaran Singh had “refused to give an assurance” that India did not 
“have any territorial…ambitions.” Singh had vaguely mentioned “minor rectifica-
tions,” a codeword, in Kissinger’s opinion, that meant Southern Kashmir. Nixon 
remarked, “by God, the country [US] doesn’t give a shit [about India-Pakistan]. 
That’s the point.”
 President Nixon realistically assessed the situation and saw the scenarios 
involving nuclear war for what they were—unlikely contingencies:
Nixon: Are we being over anxious on the hotline? No, we’re not. Basically, 
all we’re doing is asking for a reply. We’re not letting the Russians diddle us 
along, point one…And, second, all we’re doing is to reiterate what I said to 
the Agriculture Minister and what you said to Vorontsov. Right? 
Kissinger: Right. 
Nixon: Does that sound like a good plan to you? 
Kissinger:  It’s a ... typical Nixon plan. I mean it’s bold. You’re putting your 
chips into the pot again. But my view is that if we do nothing, there’s a cer-
tainty of a disaster. 
Nixon: Yeah. 
Kissinger: This way there’s a high possibility of one, but at least we’re com-
ing off like men.
Encouraging Chinese troop movements against India entailed risks, but Nixon saw 
them as more of a means of forcing Indian restraint in Pakistan. With US backing, 
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a Soviet attack on China in support of India was, in the President’s estimation, un-
likely:
Nixon: The reason that I suggested that the Chinese move is they talked 
about the Soviet divisions on their border and all that sort of thing. You 
know that the Soviets at this point aren’t about to go ripping into that damn 
mess, having in mind the fact of their gains from the Indian thing…
Kissinger: The Chinese, well, we asked, but that’s not the reason they’re 
doing it.
Nixon: The way you put it, Henry, the way you put it is very different as I 
understand.  You said, “Look, we’re doing all these things, why don’t you 
threaten them?” Remember I said, “Threaten, move a couple of people.” …
Look, we have to scare these bastards…
Kissinger: My feeling is, Mr. President, leaving completely aside what 
we’ve said, if the outcome of this is that Pakistan is swallowed by India; 
China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated by the Soviet Union; it will be a 
change in the world balance of power of such magnitude…that the security 
of the United States for—maybe forever, certainly for decades—we will 
have a guaranteed war in the Middle East, then…
Nixon: The point is, the fact of the matter is I’d put [it] in more Armaged-
don terms than reserves when I say that the Chinese move and the Soviets 
threaten and then we start lobbing nuclear weapons. That isn’t what hap-
pens. That isn’t what happens. What happens is we then do have a hotline to 
the Soviets and we finally just say now what goes on here? 
Kissinger: We don’t have to lob nuclear weapons. We have to go on alert. 
Nixon noted that the Armageddon scenarios were, however, hypothetical: “Well, 
we’re talking about a lot of ifs. Russia and China aren’t going to go to war.” Kiss-
inger disagreed, but Nixon pointed out that the timing was just wrong for a world 
war. The President counseled prudence: “Well, let me put it this way. I have always 
felt that India and Pakistan, inevitably, would have a war. And there can always be 
a war in the Mideast. As far as Russia and China is [are] concerned there are other 
factors too overwhelming at this particular point for them to go at each other.”66 
 Less than two hours later, Vorontsov called Kissinger with an “immediate 
reply” to the President’s message: 
The first contacts with the Government of India and personally with Prime 
Minister I. Gandhi…testify to the fact that the Government of India has 
no intention to take any military actions against West Pakistan. The Soviet 
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leaders believe that this makes the situation easier and hope that the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan will draw from this appropriate conclusions. As far as 
other questions raised in the President’s letter are concerned the answers 
will be given in the shortest of time.
Vorontsov said he had not “been instructed to say this,” but in his “personal ca-
pacity” he wanted Kissinger to know that Gromyko had returned from vacation, 
and the Soviet Ambassador to the UN had “been discussing with the authorities 
in delegation along the lines we discussed with the President,” with “all kinds of 
guarantees.”67 Vorontsov repeatedly assured Kissinger that the US and USSR were 
in agreement, and that there was a chance for cooperation. 
 Meanwhile, another letter from Nixon to Brezhnev went out via the “hot-
line” at 11:30 a.m. The message was curt: 
[A]fter delaying for 72 hours in anticipation of your [formal] reply…I had 
set in train certain moves in the United Nations Security Council…These 
cannot now be reversed. I must also note that Indian assurances still lack 
any concreteness. I am still prepared to proceed along the lines of set forth 
in my letter of December 10, as well as in conversations with your chargé 
d’affaires Vorontsov, and my talk with your Agriculture Minister…68
The hotline message showed that the US had clearly taken a hard line with the 
Soviets and reflected the White House belief that India would attack West Paki-
stan—regardless of Indian or Soviet pronouncements to the contrary. The next day, 
December 13, the Soviets responded with a brief hotline message of their own, 
which stated that they were conducting a “clarification of all the circumstances in 
India” and that the message had been “in accordance with the confidential exchange 
of opinions.”69
The Conclusion of the Indo-Pakistani War and the Radford Affair
As soon as Nixon and Kissinger returned from a two-day summit with French 
President Georges Pompidou at the Azores, the intensity of the crisis ratcheted up 
even before the two had returned to American soil. Once Air Force One landed at 
Andrews AFB, members of the press scurried to report potentially groundbreak-
ing news that the President might cancel the Moscow summit. The source of the 
news was none other than some comments Kissinger made on the plane that were 
supposed to be “unattributed,” a journalistic rule of thumb known as the “Lindley 
Rule.”70 In violation of a gentlemen’s agreement that went back to the 1950s, the 
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Washington Post attributed the comments to the National Security Adviser on the 
front page the next morning.71 The Post story distracted Nixon and Kissinger’s at-
tention from what would become a much larger problem inextricably linked to the 
India-Pakistan crisis: the Anderson leaks. An investigative journalist in the mold of 
turn-of-the-century muckrakers, Anderson later topped Nixon’s much publicized 
“enemies list.” In particular, Anderson’s syndicated column of December 14th set 
in motion a fast-paced White House investigation.72 The investigation was led by 
John Ehrlichman and the White House “Plumbers,” which had been assembled in 
the wake of the publication of the Pentagon Papers earlier that year.73 The Plumb-
ers investigation turned up some alarming news. Under polygraphic interrogations 
on December 15th and 16th, Yeoman Charles Radford revealed that the leadership of 
the US military had been spying on the White House through the JCS-NSC liaison 
office, and, more specifically, on Kissinger—the lynchpin in the backchannels to 
the Soviets—since November 1970.74
 By December 15th, the UN Security Council was deadlocked. Representing 
Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto eloquently argued that the Security Council’s failure 
to act effectively legalized Indian aggression against Pakistan. Bhutto then stormed 
out of the session. Kissinger-Vorontsov exchanges later that day reflected differ-
ences of opinion over the UN deadlock: the US continued to support a UK resolu-
tion, while the Soviets pushed a Polish resolution. The real emphasis of the meeting 
was preventing hostilities in West Pakistan, coupled with a sense that a failure to 
maintain solidarity in the UN could reflect poorly on the status of US-Soviet rela-
tions.75 
 The Nixon White House was clearly displeased that the US and the Soviet 
Union could not agree to jointly call for a simple ceasefire and withdrawal. Both 
superpowers had raised the stakes by dispatching naval forces to the Bay of Bengal, 
and rising tension in the backchannel exchanges reflected increasing antagonism. 
In a phone call with Kissinger on the morning of December 16, Nixon vented his 
anger with the Soviets over the course of events. If the Indians failed to accept a 
ceasefire, after the US had privately applied pressure to the Soviets, Nixon said, 
“Now in the event we are going to end up by saying to the Russians, ‘You proved 
to be so untrustworthy we can’t deal with you on any issues.’” Kissinger saw some 
hope for the Soviets pushing the Indians into accepting a ceasefire. “They still may 
get us a ceasefire,” the National Security Advisor stated.76
 With much greater speed than the carefully crafted and symbolic actions 
of the Kissinger-Vorontsov exchanges, the meeting with Matskevich, the hotline 
messages, and the frequent phone calls between the White House and the Soviet 
embassy, the war in South Asia ended. On the afternoon of December 16, 1971, In-
dia accepted Pakistan’s unconditional surrender in the East, and hostilities quickly 
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came to a close the next day after India announced a ceasefire in the West. Negotia-
tions over war reparations, POWs, and the political settlement for East Pakistan—
now the new nation of Bangladesh—lasted for several months. The lesson Nixon 
and Kissinger took away from the Indo-Pakistani conflict was that the US needed 
to act tough with the Soviets, which reinforced their earlier impressions of how to 
deal effectively with the Soviets.77 
Conclusion
Added to extant documentary collections, the surreptitiously taped conversations 
relating to US-Soviet backchannel and the nearly complete documentary record of 
exchanges between Kissinger and Dobrynin, Kissinger and Vorontsov, and Nixon 
and Brezhnev show the Nixon administration’s desire to take a hard line with the 
Soviet Union and to compel the Soviets to restrain the Indians. Although Nixon 
and Kissinger contended that their actions had forced the Soviet hand and removed 
the Indian threat of dismembering West Pakistan, the case is still not closed and 
full confirmation is still not entirely possible in the absence of materials relating to 
Indian cabinet meetings, notes of the Soviet Politburo, and Indo-Soviet exchanges.
 The critics stand on solid ground in arguing that Nixon and Kissinger per-
sonalized policy with anti-Indian zeal and sympathy for Yahya, although arguing 
that these prejudices defined American policy is not entirely accurate. Nixon’s and 
Kissinger’s behavior clearly remained within the rational actor model, based on 
perceived national interests. Initially, Pakistan served as the gateway to Sino-Amer-
ican rapprochement, and then US commitment to a shared ally was designed to 
impress the Chinese. Moreover, India’s tangible support for the Mukti Bahini at-
tacks into Pakistan alienated the White House. Nixon’s and Kissinger’s prejudicial 
background, if anything, confirmed their policy perceptions and resulted in more 
than one outburst captured for posterity by Nixon’s taping system. Nixon’s per-
sonal experience with the Indians and the Pakistanis, and with Gandhi and Yahya 
in particular, confirmed his views of Indian “aggression” and Pakistani good faith 
at facilitating the opening to China and accepting Indian concessions, such as al-
lowing UN observers and keeping Mujib alive. Talk of “toughness,” “bold action,” 
and “coming across as men,” reflected the White House sentiments about mascu-
line virtues, while derogatory remarks about Indira Gandhi reflected the gendered 
speech of dealing with a very shrewd, tough woman who transcended supposed 
feminine vices. 
 On the charge of conflating regional issues with the global Cold War game, 
the critics of the Nixon administration have a stronger case. Nixon and Kissinger 
displayed amazing indifference to the fact that the Indians and the Pakistanis were 
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pursuing their own national interests on the Subcontinent. However, the critics’ 
charge that the White House risked World War Three by its allegedly reckless ac-
tions is somewhat mitigated following a review of the fuller documentary record 
and the substance of US rhetoric and actions via US-Soviet backchannels. The 
messages to the Soviets primarily revolved around joint action at the UN and en-
couraging the Soviets to impose restraint on the part of their special ally, India. 
The backchannel exchanges show a steady—not reckless—progression of actions. 
At no point did Nixon increase the readiness status of US strategic nuclear forces. 
The movement of Task Force 74 for ostensibly humanitarian purposes, to aid the 
evacuation of American citizens from East Pakistan, was plausible, and the real 
reason—as a response to Soviet naval movements and as a signal to India—was not 
unjustified. 
 Nixon’s policies on South Asia provided an ideal opportunity for Kissinger 
to centralize the policy formulation and implementation in the White House. Kiss-
inger bypassed Secretary of State Rogers and the State Department with an impres-
sive degree of self-promotion. Nixon did not completely bypass the State Depart-
ment during the crisis and war, but he limited its role to presenting the public case 
at the UN and managing the refugee crisis. Nixon and Kissinger genuinely believed 
that India had instigated the hostilities and they believed that India had designs on 
West Pakistan incompatible with US interests. However, the only way to prove 
that one way or another would be for Indian archives to open to the extent which 
American sources have become available.
 The situation on the Subcontinent ultimately defied the attempts of the su-
perpowers to manage the crisis. The actions of Indira Gandhi, Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto, and Mujibur Rahman were ultimately more important in determining 
the final outcome than those of Nixon, Kissinger, Vorontsov, and Brezhnev. Nev-
ertheless, the Nixon White House reliance on backchannels with the Soviet-Union 
(and tilting to China at the UN) was triangular diplomacy in action. As Jussi Han-
himäki has argued, the tilt towards Pakistan was, essentially, a tilt toward China. 
The policy actors on all sides were playing roles partially prescribed by Cold War 
divisions. The procedures they established would prove more useful as Nixon went 
to China and as the North Vietnamese launched the largest offensive since 1968 
against South Vietnam.
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